BP called out on safety violations related to Valhall fire by Norway PSA

Source: Petroleum Safety Authority Norway

The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) has notified BP (NYSE:BP) of orders following its investigation of the Valhall PCP fire on July 13, 2011. Serious non-conformities related to BP’s management system for activities on the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS) have been identified.

The incident on the Valhall PCP production platform in the North Sea involved the breakdown of a crane engine through overheating, which led to a fire in the vent stack for the installation’s compressors.

A minor blaze was caused by the engine breakdown in the crane machinery space. Overheating combined with a defective spark arrestor and silencer meant that red-hot particles leaving the exhaust pipe blew across and ignited flammable gases from the vent stack.

Extinguishing the flames proved difficult, and it was decided in the end to use the water monitors on the standby ship for this purpose. One hour and thirty-seven minutes passed from detection of the fire until it had been extinguished.

No people were physically injured by the incident. Under slightly different circumstances, however, it could have escalated and created a serious position on the installation, with personal injuries or loss of life.

Production on Valhall was shut down for nine and a half weeks as a result of the incident.

Breaches 

The PSA’s investigation of the incident has identified a number of serious breaches of the regulations related to BP’s management system for NCS activities. These relate to lack of maintenance, deficient maintenance management, inadequacies in risk identification and deficient barrier management.

The investigation identified non-conformities in relation to:

•machinery protection of the crane engine
•classification of and maintenance program for the crane engine’s spark arrestor and silencer
•updating of maintenance program for crane engines
•fire and gas detection system
•management of work processes and follow-up of identified risks
•information on hazards
•barrier management and handling of non-conformities
•risk assessment of ignition in vent lines
•turbine exhaust led to a hazardous area
•handling of hazards and accidents.

On that basis, the PSA has notified BP of the following orders:

Pursuant to section 69 of the framework HSE regulations relating to administrative decisions, cf section 6 of the management regulations relating to management of health, safety and the environment, section 21 relating to follow-up and section 22 relating to handling of non-conformities, BP is ordered to initiate the necessary measures on its ageing installations related to

•risk assessment and follow-up of identified technical faults and deficiencies which emerge from maintenance history and in notifications

•defining and coordinating areas of responsibility and authority related to crane maintenance, 

cf chapter 6.1.5 of the report.

Pursuant to section 69 of the framework HSE regulations relating to administrative decisions, cf section 5 of the management regulations relating to barriers and section 22 relating to handling of non-conformities, BP is ordered to

•implement the necessary measures to ensure that specific performance criteria which follow from established performance standards are implemented and followed up

•identify barrier elements which fail to accord with performance requirements, establish a scheduled action plan for necessary improvement of deficiencies, and identify and implement compensatory action until the improvements have been completed, 

cf chapter 6.1.7 of the report.

Pursuant to section 69 of the framework HSE regulations relating to administrative decisions, cf section 45 of the activities regulations relating to maintenance, section 46 relating to classification and section 47 relating to maintenance programmes, BP is ordered to

•review and assess its own systems for maintenance management on its ageing installations, and thereby ensure that the maintenance programs and their execution are tailored to the age and condition of the installations and the equipment, 

cf chapters 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 of the report.

The deadline for establishing a binding plan for this work is set at 1 February 2012. The deadline for complying with the order is set at 1 July 2012. We must be notified when the order has been complied with. 


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